COLOMBIA – FROM MAGIC TO REALISM (part 1)

Bueno. Ingrid Betancourt is free. The American contractors are free. The war with communist terrorists is almost over. For all of you who have not been fortunate enough to discover the boundless charms of Colombia, it is time to chart your flights. Or just about.

Most of you do not realize that I am writing about the 4th largest nation in the Western Hemisphere. The only South American country with access to both oceans. A nation tri-sected not by one Andean range, but three. One of very few places on earth where from a tropical beach you can contemplate snow-capped peaks. What will separate you from them is a jungle with hidden pre-Colombian cities. And until recently, teeming with leftist thugs.

But even those who have not had a chance to explore the extraordinary greenery of Colombia’s landscape have at least once in their lives come across the country’s most prominent exports – Garcìa Màrquez’s realismo màgico, Botero’s jocular voluptuosity or the nation’s “three Co’s” – some coal, more coffee and even more cocaine.

There are two Colombias. There is Colombia Colombians are proud of – a nation historically unscathed by autocratic regimes, blessed with a modern economy, vibrant urban middle class, parks, pedestrian zones and a metropolitan transportation system that serves as a model for developing countries. This is a country of a US-educated elite, unparalleled feminine beauty (probably rivaled only by neighboring Venezuela), rich mineral reserves and a GDP per capita of some $6800 – twice the level of China’s.

And then, there is the fragmented, lamentably poor rural Colombia. Home to the world’s largest organized crime networks, ravaged by decades-long struggle between neo-stalinist guerrillas and right-wing militias, underscored by the failure of the state to protect its citizens, four million of whom have fled the country.

This amazing contrast has been at the very root of Colombia’s problems and the rebel groups’ violent activity, which outlived the relevance of their professed ideological background. Fuelled by highly profitable underground economy and capable management, the guerrillas survived the collapse of leftist ideologies and have continued the armed struggle as a way to protect their economic empires. And for decades, the government failed to respond to this challenge accordingly – through well-funded and capably managed operations.

The reason lies in the fact that for many years the affluent urban Colombia lived in a relative safety and isolation of the dramatic, bloody events that played out in the countryside. This unsustainable balance was eventually broken at the end of the 1990’s, when the combined forces of the economic crisis, insurgents’ cheeky intransigence and government failure put the very survival of the Republic at stake.



WHO ARE COLOMBIANS?
Because of their history, unusual ethnic mix and insulating environment, Colombians are quite unique among Andean Latinos.

The Amerindian traditions were pulverized by early settlers, but few immigrants reached the hinterland until the coffee boom in the 1930s. Consequently, whereas other immigration nations fixed the loyalty of primary groups to protect their interests against newcomers, no such fossilizing tradition was necessary Colombia. Just like in other Latin American societies, the family has always played an important role, but the circle of acquaintances has always been wider and flexible enough for Colombians to fill in the organizational vacuum between the elitist State structures and the local communities. Given the inaccessibility of many areas of the country and the fabulous riches that unfolded outside the government control, the incentive to build parallel networks of authority was high, whenever supported by economic rationale.

As a result, Colombians tend to reward individual talent and initiative to much larger extent than other Latinos. Even at times of global ideological schisms, Colombians’ circumstancial pragmatism and a very “un-Latin” propensity for entrepreneurial risk-taking prevented total economic stagnation. Not surprisingly, Colombians make better businessmen (and even businesswomen) than many other South Americans. Their management capabilities are objects of neighbors’ tacit envy.

This does not mean that initial capital accumulation leads to creation of globally competitive companies. The structures Colombians tend to build are strongly hierarchical and impatience to obtain immediate satisfaction stunts growth of their enterprises. Seldom do they build a scale that would position them competitively in the rivalry for political or economic influence. Rather, the multiplication of interests, opportunistic flexibility and the importance of the local context have led to the fragmentation of the society in which communities took issues into their hands. Without falling into naturalistic determinism, it is worth underlying the inaccessible character of the various fiefs – nestled in insulated valleys and still speaking the same language only because 300 years is not long enough to replicate the linguistic variety of the Swiss Alps, the Balkans or PNG Highlands.

Well above these divisions, and unlike in other Latin nations, Colombia has maintained a civilian government with regular free elections, only interspersed by two short-lived attempts to introduce military rule. Polls conducted by Latinobarometro in 17 Latin American countries routinely confirm that Colombians have the strongest attachment to democratic values among various nations inhabiting the varied ecosystems that separate Rio Grande from Ushuaia.

This is more than a passing comment. The tradition of dictatorship, whatever its form - latifundia-based caudillism or a military junta - indelibly shaped the political cultures of Latin America. It spawned an entire literary genre – novela del dictador – and its Nobel-prized epiphenomena: Asturias’ “El señor Presidente”, Roa Bastos’ “Yo el supreme”, Carpentier’s “El recurso del método”, Valle Inclàn’s “Tirano Banderas”. Even if Colombian literature joined the bandwagon (notably in Garcìa Màrquez’s unreadable “Otoño de patriarca”), the Satanist narrative of an inaccessible Supreme Leader – the Lucifer tucked in his sprawling palacio and projecting his ruthless, infernal tentacles of power has never captured the political imagination of Colombians.

But it did capture the nation’s economic reality. By the 1980s, the extraordinary flourishing of drug cartels generated the most powerful underground big shots since the times of Al Capone. The brash, ebullient personality of Pablo Escobar perfectly fit in with the Latin myth of a tragically isolated, brutal, boundlessly wealthy, elusive, eloquent populist with friends in high places (from Norriega to Ortega). Several years after Escobar’s death I went to visit the presumptive headquarters of the cartel in Medellin. The high-rise ruin still stood there, a monument to the hierarchy of terror, untouched because untouchable. Smelling with horror.



CIVIL WARS LIKE THE CORDILLERA – NOT ONE BUT THREE
Despite the commitment to democratic institutions, periods of widespread conflict have plagued Colombia, leading to civil wars at the turn of the 20th c, in 1950’s and again recently. The foundations for such recurrent social convulsions have been laid by the social and economic fragmentation of the population, and the relative isolation of the privileged elite. In fact, the elite networks may have favored relatively consensual politics, in which opposition parties should be regularly included in the government. However, emerging political forces were not co-opted into the system, but suppressed, leading to the emergence, since the 1960’s, of three armed groups:
• neo-stalinist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, 1964)
• pro-Cuban Ejército de Liberacion Nacional (ELN, 1965)
• maoist Ejército Popular de Liberacion (EPL, 1966)

The world today may be unrecognizable for those who have stuck to their jungle-based guerrilla anachronism and the very durability of the conflict has astonished distant observers. There are several reasons for it.

By 1970’s, massive urban migration and accelerated modernization had seen the emergence of new social classes which the State’s administrative structure failed to accommodate. In fact, the failure was threefold: economic (lack of perspective for economic welfare, tax evasion and free riding on public costs), political (non-incorporation of large parts of the population into mainstream public life, degradation of regional authority, division between the center and the periphery abandoned to the guerrillas) and ideological (particularism, poor civic sentiment and weak national identity).

By 2001, Colombia’s 150’000-strong conscript army faced 40’000-strong array of rebel forces, right-wing vigilantes and organized crime, each driven by a mix of ideology, pursuit of wealth or - simply - revenge. Almost 40% of the country’s territory was off-bounds.



But even then, at the apex of their military power, the guerrillas in Colombia stood little chance to become a political force. In few cases in which insurgents did submit themselves to the electoral sanction, they fared very poorly. With the possible exception of extremist rural forces supported by puritan ideologies (e.g. Maoism in China and Cambodia, Taliban in Afghanistan), most revolutions only succeed when its leaders make alliances with other sectors or elites, something that FARC was unable to achieve. It is arguable if they were interested in the first place.

The rising security threats to the comfortable urban lifestyle, an epidemic of abductions, economic slump, corruption and the failure to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with the terrorists created perfect conditions for a strongman who could command support over and above the 300-year old political axes. Early this decade, Uribe proved to be that man.

Today, there seems to be an increased sense of national pride in a country which 10 years ago had fallen to a near-pariah status. Colombians are generally embarrassed by the image problem from which the country has been suffering for decades. Linguistically, they have even learned to dismiss the seriousness of the situation by employing evasive euphemisms. Insurrection and paramilitary excesses are labeled “problemas de orden pùblico” (public order issues) and the high crime rate: “altos ìndices de violencia” (high indices of violence).

There is little doubt that the communist terrorists are cracking and a little bit of national euphoria is well deserved. But longer-term improvements in security and livelihood for all Colombians will hinge on more than just successful military actions and the liberation of captives. The nation has achieved the professionalization of the armed forces. Now it needs a roll-out of sustainable social programs, economic empowerment of lower social strata and the reinforcement of the State’s presence in all parts of the country.

But do not delay your visit until then. This is a country on the rise.